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CHAPTER 6
Value Creation and Power Asymmetries 
in Digital Ecosystems: A Study of a Cloud 
Gaming Provider
Arto Ojala, Nina Helander, and Pasi Tyrväinen
Abstract Digital platforms connecting users and service providers have a 
central role in determining the value creation structure of ecosystems. 
Platform developers try to achieve a dominant position for the platform with 
a strong ecosystem around it. The size and attractiveness of the services 
can attract new users, and growing user volume can bring new co- operative 
service providers to the service partner network. An interesting question is 
how the presence of power and potential power asymmetry affect the value 
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creation capability and the structure of a network around a platform? This 
chapter describes an example of value creation and the influence of power 
asymmetry in a digital ecosystem built around a cloud gaming platform.
Keywords Digital ecosystems • Digitalisation • Digital platforms • 
Partner networks
6.1  IntroductIon
The digitalisation of artifacts provides new opportunities that change tra-
ditional business models and how services are delivered to end-users 
(Baber et  al. 2019; Ojala 2016; Yoo et  al. 2010). In particular, digital 
platforms that enable emergence of new kinds of ecosystems are changing 
the way people interact with digital technology (Adner 2012; Yoo 2010). 
These ecosystems can be conceptualised as “a loosely coupled network of 
actors who interact and offer resources of different kinds, which together 
form a digital service around the platform” (Ojala et al. 2018, p. 729). In 
ecosystems, digital platforms have a central role that determines the struc-
ture of the ecosystem. Achieving a dominant position for a platform and 
building a strong ecosystem around the platform is a demanding process 
in which value creation has a central role.
Compared to the traditional value creation chains where value moves 
from a firm to customers (Porter 1985), digital platform providers must 
consider how value is generated for multiple sides of the platform 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006). Furthermore, actors on the different sides of the 
platform depend on the size and attractiveness of the other side of the mar-
ket (Adner 2012). For instance, in the videogame industry where competi-
tion among various gaming platforms is intense (Lee 2012), game studios 
are more likely to develop games for platforms that have a lot of existing 
players. In line, video game players tend to favour gaming platforms that 
provide a high volume of interesting game content. Developing a platform 
that provides value to multisided markets and building a strong ecosystem 
is a complex and demanding process (Ojala and Lyytinen 2018). Even if a 
firm has an excellent innovation for a gaming platform, the firm’s value 
creation still largely relies on other innovations within the ecosystem (Adner 
2012; Lee 2012) and the power the firm has over other firms.
To better understand value creation and the concept of power in digital 
ecosystems, this chapter examines the value creation literature (Allee 
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2000) and management studies on organisational power (Astley and 
Sachdeva 1984; Mintzberg 1978). Specifically, we contribute to under-
standing of this topic in the context of digital platforms by studying (1) 
what kind of direct and indirect value is generated in the focal partner 
network, (2) how the focal network and the power positions evolve over 
time, and (3) how power asymmetry influences value creation within the 
network. We focus on the videogame industry because it has multisided 
markets, and ecosystems have a strong role (Lee 2012; McIntyre and 
Srinivasan 2017). Further, the industry has a relatively long history with 
well-established gaming platforms (Lee 2012). This makes the entry of 
newcomers challenging as they may have very little power in the market, 
and they have to create new ecosystems from scratch (Ojala 2016).
6.2  dIgItal Platforms and EcosystEms
Digital platforms are generally organised in a network-like architecture, 
referred to as a layered modular structure with loosely coupled interfaces 
(Yoo et al. 2010). The architecture forms a hybrid of a modular structure 
and a layered structure (cf. Ulrich 1995). The architecture emerges when 
digital components and functions form the primary platform services or 
when the components and functions are embedded in hierarchically 
organised product structures (Yoo et al. 2010). In the loosely coupled, 
multi-layered architecture, the digital platform is organised in four layers: 
(1) device, (2) network, (3) service, and (4) content. The device layer 
refers to physical devices that connect and interact with the platform and 
its services, such as a television set, a mobile phone, or a gaming console. 
The network layer refers to the networking protocols that the platform 
offers to communicate over the networks to devices at the device layer. 
The service layer relates to the functionality of the applications that run on 
the platform and that enable users to use the content across different 
devices. The content layer covers the content that customers interact with, 
such as music, games, or videos. These layers form an ecosystem around 
the digital platform where several diverse actors, such as platform owners, 
content providers, telecom operators, device manufacturers, end-users, 
etc. (Koch and Windsperger 2017; Tiwana 2013), may participate, create 
value, and form multisided markets (Eisenmann et  al. 2006). All these 
actors shape the competition and power asymmetries around the digital 
platform because each actor has unique interests and motivations for par-
ticipating in the ecosystem.
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6.3  ValuE crEatIon WIthIn dIgItal EcosystEms
In this chapter, we use term “partner network” to refer to various actors 
within the ecosystem that cooperate directly with the focal firm. To oper-
ate successfully in the ecosystem, a firm must recognise the potential and 
current actors in the ecosystem that contains the firm’s partner network 
(Ojala and Helander 2014). Thus, a partner network is a more focused 
part of the larger digital network. In the platform context, the network has 
the characteristics of the triangular structure typical of two-sided markets 
(Eisenmann et al. 2006). These partners can usually be grouped into pro-
ducers and customers, and in the gaming industry, into game developers 
and consumers. Between these two main actor groups, the platform pro-
vider as the focal firm acts as an intermediary for creating value. Further, 
the focal firm needs to identify the value of their own offering, and how 
this value can be delivered to benefit other actors in the network. Thus, a 
firm should map all the actors in the ecosystem that could benefit from the 
firm’s offering and the resources that the firm will need to commercialise 
their service (Allee 2000).
Created value can be defined as a trade-off between benefits and sacri-
fices (Lapierre 2000) that can be monetary or non-monetary. Monetary 
benefits and costs are usually easier to measure. However, the role of non- 
monetary rewards and costs in value perception is significant, too. Non- 
monetary rewards can be a status reward, emotional reward, or gain of 
new competences, while non-monetary costs may include the time, effort, 
energy, and amount of conflict customers engage in to obtain the product 
or service (Walter et al. 2001).
Value creation from a functional perspective (Walter et al. 2001) offers 
a view on the types of activities that actors may perform to create more 
value for network members. According to function-oriented value analy-
sis, a firm may gain value from relationships with direct and indirect func-
tions. Direct value can be produced through profit, volume, and safeguard 
functions. (Walter et  al. 2001). For example, a safeguard function is a 
direct value creation function: If the firm has a long contract with the 
customer, this relationship creates safeguard value for the firm. Indirect 
functions, in contrast, require the input of third parties. Indirect functions 
include market, access, and innovation functions. For example, the market 
function means that one actor gives access to another market area with 
new potential partner actors.
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6.4  thE concEPt of PoWEr In PartnEr nEtWorks
Astley and Sachdeva (1984) identified three sources of power: hierarchical 
authority, resource control, and network centrality. Hierarchical authority 
often relates to official positions that actors have over one another, so they 
are usually coupled with actors like authorities or supervisors (Astley and 
Sachdeva 1984). Resource control looks at the environment of an organ-
isation, as it states that everyone is dependent on the resources of others: 
“organizations are open social systems that require a supply of resources 
from the environment in order to sustain their operations” (Astley and 
Sachdeva 1984, p.  106). Thus, no organisation or actor can act alone. 
Power based on resources is naturally higher in the case of critical or hard- 
to- obtain resources than in bulk resources. The third source of power, 
network centrality, refers to the position of an actor in a network (Easton 
1992). Håkansson and Snehota (1989) argued that network actors aim to 
increase their own power and influence in networks as the actors believe 
that more powerful positions within a network will enable the actors to 
achieve other objectives. An actor’s power and position within a network 
are closely related. In the end, power is realised in the interaction pro-
cesses that form a relationship (Turnbull and Valla 1986); there cannot be 
power without the other part of the relationship.
6.5  rEsEarch mEthod
This chapter examines a qualitative, longitudinal case. A case study pro-
vides detailed (Edmondson and Mcmanus 2007) and empirically rich 
data (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) connected to a complex phenom-
enon. A longitudinal case study also facilitates examination of the evolu-
tion of a firm’s activities (Eisenhardt 1989) and partner networks (Ford 
and Redwood 2005). In the data collection, we combined interview and 
secondary material covering the whole history of the firm from 2000 to 
2015. We conducted 15 interviews, each lasting 45–90 minutes. 
Secondary data sources included the firm’s brochures and press releases, 
which provided an extensive and detailed historical description of the 
firm. By using this information, we also triangulated the information. In 
the data analysis, we followed the steps: (1) data condensation, (2) data 
display, and (3) drawing and verifying conclusions as recommended by 
Miles and Huberman (1994).
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6.6  g-clustEr
The case firm, G-cluster, develops games-on-demand services. Throughout 
the history, G-cluster has been small, employing 10–40 persons. Compared 
to traditional videogame platform providers (see Lee 2012), G-cluster’s 
business idea is based on a completely different way of providing video-
games to players. Traditionally, games are installed on a computer or a 
game console that runs the game. In the G-cluster business model, games 
are run on the platform operated by telecom operators on their game serv-
ers. The game server transmits the game content to the end users’ devices 
over the broadband network. The client devices receive the stream, display 
the game, and transmit users’ commands back to the game server. Thus, 
G-cluster’s gaming platform makes it possible to bring games to the cloud 
environment. The commercialisation has been challenging as the industry 
is dominated by large and well-known gaming platform providers making 
market entry for newcomers difficult. However, as G-cluster was the first 
cloud-based gaming platform provider in the market, the firm’s innova-
tion attracted increasing interest among potential partners.
6.6.1  Creation of a Partner Network
G-cluster’s business goal was new in 2000 and took time to evolve, thus 
the first real partner network emerged in 2005 (Fig.  6.1). The figure 
shows the key partners within the ecosystem that G-cluster acted with 
directly (straight arrow) when the firm commercialised its service. First, 
G-cluster needed content for the gaming platform. To acquire game con-
tent, which was critical for G-cluster’s service, the firm partnered with 
game publishers and licensed games for the platform on a revenue- 
sharing basis.
Revenue sharing gave G-cluster access to a portfolio of games while 
protecting the firm’s cash flow. However, the potential revenue was not, 
in many cases, appealing as a primary partnering factor for the game pub-
lishers. As a result, G-cluster had to demonstrate other benefits—benefits 
that would bring value to the game publishers—if they provided games for 
the platform (see also Ojala and Tyrväinen 2011a, b). G-cluster motivated 
game studios by emphasising the benefits of cloud computing, like avoid-
ing piracy, illegal copying, and second-hand markets for the games.
G-cluster also needed partners that are capable of running their cloud 
gaming service on their servers and provide access for players to services. 
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Consequently, G-cluster developed relationships with telecom operators 
that became important partners within the ecosystem. Telecom operators 
had good marketing channels and a large, existing customer base. As they 
are big players in the market, they also offered more visibility and a brand 
name that could be used for marketing purposes. Operators also moti-
vated game studios to make their games available on G-cluster’s platform. 
However, the move toward cooperation with telecom operators was not 
easy due to their powerful market position. G-cluster needed to demon-
strate the value of their product for telecom operators. In addition to 
monetary benefits, G-cluster’s service offered a good opportunity to 
extend the telecom operators’ existing product portfolio and differentiate 
their offering from that of competitors.
To commercialise the service and to partner with telecom operators, 
G-cluster needed resources from video-on-demand service providers, set- 
top box manufacturers, and middleware software providers. For video-on- 
demand service providers, G-cluster’s game platform offered new 
functionalities and enabled them to offer more content for telecom opera-




















Direct relationship = straight arrow
Indirect relationship = dashed arrow
Fig. 6.1 The partner network in 2005
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and G-cluster’s gaming platform brought extra value. Middleware software 
providers, which sell software to telecom operators, benefited from 
G-cluster’s platform, as they were able to integrate game-on-demand 
services in the telecom operators’ set-top boxes. The cooperation among 
these three different types of firms was based mainly on the mutual bene-
fits that the partner network provided rather than on monetary benefits. 
These relationships were symmetric in the power aspect.
Portals (like Yahoo) were also important partners within the partner 
network that gave PC users access to G-cluster’s cloud gaming service, 
and enabled multihoming of the service. The portals also took care of 
marketing activities and charged customers via the portals’ invoicing 
systems. For the portals, G-cluster’s cloud service generated revenue 
without requiring any investment, and the service was easily integrated 
with their current business.
6.6.2  Evolution in Partner Networks
Over a five-year period, changes in the ecosystem, markets and G-cluster’s 
services impacted the partner network (Fig. 6.2). Due to the increasing 













Direct relationship = straight arrow
Indirect relationship = dashed arrow
Fig. 6.2 The partner network in 2010
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games, G-cluster focused solely on Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) 
networks and users and removed the PC market from the network. In 
addition, the operators had increased their IPTV offering remarkably, and 
there was ongoing growth in the market as IPTV connections became 
more reliable.
G-cluster also developed its product further, making it a ready-made 
service for operators. For instance, G-cluster developed their own billing 
system and a user interface (menu) that players used to select games from 
the G-cluster virtual games store. By including these features, G-cluster 
became less dependent on other firms and strengthened their position in 
the partner network.
In 2010, G-cluster established a relationship with a large and well- 
known server manufacturer that provided cloud technologies for telecom 
operators. This relationship provided mutual benefits for both firms. The 
main point of this partnership was mutual value. For G-cluster, the coop-
eration brought in a more reliable and influential partner, one that could 
market the gaming service further to telecom operators. This reliable part-
ner increased G-cluster’s marketing and sale resources considerably. 
Conversely, by including G-cluster’s cloud gaming feature on the server 
manufacturer’s offering, they obtained added value that the manufacturer 
was able to use when they marketed their servers to operators.
6.6.3  Equal Power in a Partner Network
To multihome the service beyond IPTV operators, G-cluster brought 
their own cloud gaming console to the market in 2015. The console was 
a small physical device that connected G-cluster’s game service to players’ 
TVs without an IPTV subscription. This console made G-cluster’s gaming 
service available through any telecom operator, as the service was no lon-
ger tied to IPTV. Another change in the partner network was that G-cluster 
no longer cooperated with the server manufacturer (Fig. 6.3). In 2015, 
G-cluster had well-known operators as reference customers and no longer 
needed the server manufacturer or other third parties to reassure opera-
tors about the service. Thus, although the number of actors in the partner 
network decreased, G-cluster increased their number of critical partners. 
This change led to a more stable and co-operative network, where power 
is more equally dispersed among the actors.
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6.7  rEsults
The network’s ongoing evolution was evident in the case study. This 
process is typical for networks, caused by a change in the ecosystem, 
value creation logic, and the consolidation of relationships between 
actors. If a firm is to gain a better position in a partner network and 
market the offering, the firm must cooperate with several kinds of part-
ners. The firm must demonstrate the value of the offering to several 
partners in the network. This evolution in the network position also 
affects the power setting. The sources of power and the direct and 
indirect values between the various actors in each micro-position are 
shown in Table 6.1.
The direct value was related, in addition to monetary value, to the criti-
cal resources that G-cluster needed to commercialise its service. The direct 
value can be divided into resources enabling the service (provided by game 
studios and telecom operators) and functionalities needed for the product. 
For the partners that enabled G-cluster’s service, G-cluster provided 
mainly financial benefits as a direct value. Although indirect value was not 
critical to G-cluster’s service, this value provided substantial help in mar-
keting and networking. Indirect value worked similarly: G-cluster gained 
resources for marketing and networking, and its partners gained a new 












Direct relationship = straight arrow
Indirect relationship = dashed arrow
Fig. 6.3 The partner network in 2015
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As can be observed from Figs.  6.1, 6.2, 6.3, the partner network 
evolved from a complex structure involving several actors (in 2005) to a 
simple network structure that included only the most critical partners (in 
2015). Easton (1992) observed that the more the independence of a firm 
increases, the less fragmented its network becomes. In the G-cluster case, 
the number of partners in the network decreased over time, but the num-
ber of content and telecom operators increased. The firm’s network 
evolved through the following steps. First, the platform provider net-
worked with all possible actors operating within the different layers of the 
multilayered platform architecture (Yoo et  al. 2010) that could benefit 
from the platform to achieve market visibility. Second, after getting more 
visibility in the ecosystem, the firm focused on the most powerful actors 
within the content layer (game studios) and network layer (telecom opera-
tors), and developed deeper relationships with them. These actions 
increased the platform provider’s position in the partner network and 
made it more concentrated.
Power is increased when the focal actor has more alternatives to 
choose from, and the power position relates to the size of the firm. In 
the beginning, the telecom operators and game publishers were big 
companies that had many content and current technology suppliers from 
which to choose. However, as the technological landscape changed to 
favour G-cluster’s solution and competences, G-cluster achieved a stron-
ger position in the network and became the critical supplier. Critical 
competences and technological changes in the market acted as the trig-
ger for changes in the network structure and the power positions. Thus, 
a link between value creation capability and the power position was vis-
ible through G-cluster’s competences. The direct financial value and the 
indirect value that G-cluster provides to game publishers and telecom 
operators exceeded the competitors’ value creation capability and led to 
closer co-operation.
6.8  conclusIon
This chapter contributes understanding of digital ecosystems in several 
ways. First, the chapter incorporated network theory (Johanson and 
Mattsson 1988), management studies related to organisational power 
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(Astley and Sachdeva 1984; Mintzberg 1978), and literature on value cre-
ation (Walter et al. 2001). The chapter conceptualised the value creation 
and evolution of the partner network in the contemporary context of digi-
tal ecosystems. Specifically, the chapter provides an in-depth view of how 
a platform provider can create value with other actors in the network and 
how the value can be used to form a good network position and power 
symmetry in the market.
Second, this chapter provides detailed insights into how and why a net-
work changed over 10 years. This is important in developing a realistic 
view of value creation (Walter et al. 2001) and network development. As 
Halinen and Törnroos (2005) noted, over time networks change in rela-
tion to the problems that they aim to solve and, in this way, to the value 
they aim to create. When situations change, new kinds of actors may be 
needed in network cooperation, and this will lead to a change in the net-
work structure.
Third, this chapter provides detailed knowledge on the range of 
direct and indirect value that network actors create for each other and 
finally, for the end customer. In addition, the chapter sheds light on 
the interesting relation between value creation capability and power. 
Monetary and non- monetary value creation capabilities are needed to 
ensure the development of a stronger network position and to balance 
the asymmetric power setting that the larger firm may have in the rela-
tionship. Thus, through critical competence development that leads to 
increased value creation capability, even a small actor may enhance its 
network position.
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